Análisis de la Cooperación Internacional del Japón a Colombia de 2003 a 2008, caso de estudio Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

El trabajo, analiza en impacto de la Cooperación Internacional del Japón a Colombia estudiando la transformación que la Agencia de Cooperación Internacional del Japón (JICA) implementó durante el periodo 2003 - 2008. Para ello, parte del recorrido histórico de la actividad de la Agencia hasta 2003, en su entorno internacional y nacional, para luego determinar los diferentes factores-reto que enfrentó durante el periodo sugerido; su reorganización administrativa y presupuesta, así como los nuevos desafíos internacionales, así como sus respuestas para concluir en el decrecimiento de la ayuda a Colombia, con miras a una mejora en el mediano plazo. Emplea como herramientas teóricas la aproximación a la Cooperación Internacional planteada por Robert Keohane y el modelo básico de acción o cambio organizacional propuesto por Ernst Haas.

Works Councils: An Agency Perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in whichworks councils are supposed to monitor manager's information on behalf of the workforce,but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we considerthat workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In orderto deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they canbe expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusionmakes contingent payments costly and reduces workers' payoffs. Second, when elections areused to align works councils' interest only well compensated representatives would face aninter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's transfers at first period and losingrents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behaviour withmanagement and works councils will try to behave on the employees' interest.

Works councils: an agency perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.